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STATE EQUITY CROWDFUNDING AND INVESTOR
PROTECTION
Christopher H. Pierce-Wright
Abstract: Since Kansas enacted the first blue sky law in 1911, securities regulation has
sought to protect investors from fraud and speculation. Historically, this meant precluding
substantial numbers of small businesses from raising capital in the form of equity
investments. In order to facilitate small-business capital formation, in 2012 the federal
government passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). Although Title III
of the JOBS Act required the Securities and Exchange Commission to undergo rulemaking to
allow for small-dollar equity investments, the agency dragged its feet. In the interim, states
anxious to jumpstart their own economies took the initiative. Legislation has now been
enacted in over half the states. Although a laudable attempt to make raising capital easier,
this legislation potentially provides an avenue for fraudulent offerings and significant
investor losses. This Comment reviews the historical context in which state crowdfunding
exemptions have been passed and compares enacted state laws to the JOBS Act’s
requirements. It argues that in order to effectively prevent fraud while enabling smallbusiness capital formation, states should adopt specific protection measures in their
crowdfunding laws. These prophylactic measures, including requirements on both issuers and
intermediaries, as well as protections for investors, promise to better help business while also
protecting investors.

INTRODUCTION
On March 5, 2015, the nation’s capital completed its first equity
crowdfunding campaign.1 The offering, set up through the online
crowdfunding platform EquityEats,2 sought to raise $200,000 in thirty
days for a new restaurant in the District’s Penn Quarter neighborhood.3
In return for investing between $100 and $10,000, the 339 D.C. residents
who participated were promised a ten percent interest in the company, a
portion of the restaurant’s cash flow, and other perks like priority
reservations and an opportunity to discuss the business with
1. Steven Overly, The City’s First Equity Crowdfunding Campaign Reaches Its Goal, WASH.
POST (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/the-citys-firstequity-crowdfunding-campaign-reaches-its-goal/2015/03/05/2116ebbe-c374-11e4-ad5c3b8ce89f1b89_story.html [https://perma.cc/MF8K-D7CZ].
2. EQUITYEATS, https://www.equityeats.com/ [https://perma.cc/79KE-M9DW] (last visited Mar.
1, 2015).
3. Overly, supra note 1.
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management.4
Small-dollar equity investments, or equity crowdfunding, provide a
new means through which small business owners can raise the capital
needed to start and expand their businesses.5 Although a small subset of
the most promising companies can access any number of different
sources of financing, from venture capital firms6 to angel investors,7
most have to rely on other sources like traditional bank loans or an
owner’s personal savings.8 Slowly, those traditional constraints have
loosened as different means of financing become available. Equity
crowdfunding is one of these means, made available to small businesses
by states and, more recently, the federal government to facilitate
investment in small businesses.
Until recently, small businesses had been all but prohibited from
raising money through small-dollar equity investments. The goals of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the Commission)—to
protect investors, maintain efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation9—are inherently at odds. That conflict has disproportionately
4. J.D. Alois, Prequel, the First DC Equity Crowdfunding Offer, Closes Fully Funded,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2015, 5:07 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/03/63878prequel-the-first-dc-equity-crowdfunding-offer-closes-fully-funded/ [https://perma.cc/8A34-GL8Y].
5. Online crowdfunded investing, made most popular through online platforms like Kickstarter
and Indiegogo, has been around since ArtistShare began in 2003. DAVID M. FREEDMAN &
MATTHEW R. NUTTING, EQUITY CROWDFUNDING FOR INVESTORS: A GUIDE TO RISKS, RETURNS,
REGULATIONS, FUNDING PORTALS, DUE DILIGENCE, AND DEAL TERMS (2015). The fundraising
conducted on these earlier platforms differs from equity crowdfunding. Because a non-equity
“offering” is not registered, it cannot provide investors with anything defined as a “security” by
state or federal law. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 30–32 (2012) (distinguishing “donation” and “reward” models of
crowdfunding, which do not involve the sale of a security, from “equity” crowdfunding, which
does). The earliest crowdfunding platforms allowed businesses to offer “perks,” like a product. See,
e.g., How It Works, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/how-it-works. Because none of these
websites offer equity interests, they are not subject to securities regulation. See infra notes 167–69
and accompanying text.
6. See Dileep Rao, Why 99.95% of Entrepreneurs Should Stop Wasting Time Seeking Venture
Capital, FORBES (July 22, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dileeprao/2013/07/
22/why-99-95-of-entrepreneurs-should-stop-wasting-time-seeking-venture-capital/
[https://perma.cc/YV3Q-32WN] (discussing the limited availability of venture capital financing for
the substantial majority of small businesses).
7. See Tanya Prive, Angel Investors: How the Rich Invest, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2013, 9:27 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2013/03/12/angels-investors-how-the-rich-invest/
[https://perma.cc/CMP4-UZ2W] (“Angel investors invest their own money when participating in
startup fundraising rounds, where the typical amount raised ranges from $150,000 to $2,000,000.”).
8. Catherine Clifford, Top Sources of Small-Business Financing in 2012, ENTREPRENEUR (Jan. 2,
2012), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/222540 [https://perma.cc/D36L-HCFV].
9. What We Do, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml#.VNEgd_54rN8 [https://perma.cc/4K6G-ZQMC] (last modified June 10, 2013).
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burdened small businesses.10 Because securities regulators chose
disclosure as the primary method of investor protection, the resulting
fixed costs are substantial and cost prohibitive for many businesses
interested in accessing the public securities markets.11 During the
summer of 2011, the regulation landscape began to change when Kansas
passed the first equity crowdfunding law.12 That law was intended to
match local businesses with investors who “wanted to make a profit, but
[who] also wanted to support the business in their town.”13 That single
state exemption was followed shortly by the passage of the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act),14 which President Obama signed
into law in April of 2012.15 Title III of the JOBS Act was intended to
“open[] up exciting new opportunities for small businesses and
startups . . . to raise capital from investors online”16 by allowing
businesses to raise up to $1 million from the general public17 through
online fundraising portals.18 Unfortunately, the JOBS Act’s effectiveness
was predicated on the SEC promulgating rules within 270 days.19 The
SEC proposed rules in early 201420 and on October 30, 2015 finally
10. See generally Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing
Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1 (2007) (arguing
that, despite the SEC’s acknowledgement of hurdles small businesses face in raising capital, “with
rare exception, the SEC has turned a deaf ear” to small businesses’ needs).
11. See Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 908–09 (2011) (discussing
securities disclosure requirements and enforcement mechanisms and concluding that “a small
business issuer will typically find that the costs of a registered public offering . . . outweigh the
benefits”).
12. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21 (2015).
13. Jaime Brockway, The State That Paved the Way for Equity-Based Crowdfunding, BEACON
READER (Sept. 11, 2014, 8:08 PM), https://www.beaconreader.com/jaime-brockway/the-state-thatpaved-the-way-for-equity-based-crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/G6BN-DN4L].
14. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
15. Leigh Ann Caldwell, Obama Signs “JOBS Act” into Law, Calls It a “Game-Changer,” CBS
NEWS (Apr. 5, 2012, 3:55 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-signs-jobs-act-into-lawcalls-it-a-game-changer/ [https://perma.cc/TZ6A-HXGK].
16. Press Release, Jeff Merkley, Merkley: Crowdfunding Exciting New Opportunity for Small
Businesses and Startups (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/press-releases/
merkley-crowdfunding-exciting-new-opportunity-for-small-businesses-and-startups
[https://perma.cc/5UDV-DBMB].
17. JOBS Act § 302(a)(6), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)).
18. Id. § 302(a)(6)(C), 126 Stat. at 315 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C)).
19. Id. § 302(c), 126 Stat. at 320.
20. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Proposal on Crowdfunding (Oct. 23, 2013)
[hereinafter SEC Crowdfunding Proposal], http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/
PressRelease/1370540017677#.VNZyV_54rN8 [https://perma.cc/F3VX-JLMP].
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adopted rules to permit crowdfunding nationally.21 With federal action
pending for over three years, states began to take the initiative. The lone
Kansas exemption ballooned to over twenty-five proposed and enacted
statutes.22
Although the availability of alternative forms of investing and capitalraising is a positive development, these alternatives pose risks if
improperly regulated. In a 2013 report on the potential benefits of
crowdfunding around the world, the World Bank emphasized that, while
“[s]uccessful fraud with crowdfunding has been relatively rare,”23 it is
nonetheless “a legitimate concern.” Indeed, concerns for investor
protection were a hot topic during the federal legislation process24—a
topic eventually decided in favor of additional investor protection in
tandem with including stricter requirements on small businesses.25 By
contrast, many state statutes and regulations have been deliberately
drafted in ways that seek to create less stringent restrictions than the
federal model.26
Legal action at the state and federal levels has legitimized concerns
about fraud. First, in 2014, the Washington State Attorney General
brought a lawsuit against Altius Management and its president, Ed
Nash.27 The Attorney General’s complaint alleged that, despite raising
21. Press Release, Securities & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules to Permit Crowdfunding (Oct.
30, 2015) [hereinafter SEC Crowdfunding Adoption], http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015249.html [https://perma.cc/5U73-LKL2].
22. See Anthony J. Zeoli, State of the States—Comparative Summaries of Current Active and
Proposed Intrastate Crowdfunding Exemptions (Updated), CROWDFUNDINGLEGALHUB.COM
http://crowdfundinglegalhub.com/2015/01/16/state-of-the-states-compariative-summaries-ofcurrent-active-and-proposed-intrastate-crowdfunding-exemptions/ [https://perma.cc/8S8Q-DDXG]
(last updated Dec. 2015).
23. Crowdfunding’s Potential for the Developing World, WORLD BANK (2013),
http://www.infodev.org/infodev-files/wb_crowdfundingreport-v12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4PD9QV3S].
24. See Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 281, 295–97 (2014) (characterizing the legislation process as having “set up a battle between
two competing camps: the capital formation camp, led by Republican Congressman McHenry, and
the investor protection camp, helmed by Democratic Senator Jeff Merkley”).
25. See id. at 297–300. Parsont rehashes the compromise as, on one side, loosening the
restrictions of Rule 506 to allow issuers to use the internet to access accredited investors and, on the
other, increasing mandatory disclosures required by the eventual crowdfunding legislation. Id. at
296–99.
26. See Steven Davidoff Soloman, S.E.C.’s Delay on Crowdfunding May Just Save It, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK, (Nov. 28, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/s-e-c-sdelay-on-crowdfunding-may-just-save-it-2/ [https://perma.cc/DV5V-2SLL] (“For good or bad, the
states don’t seem to care as much about the fraud issue. Consider Texas, which last month proposed
its own crowdfunding rules that are deliberately more liberal than those proposed by the S.E.C.”).
27. Press Release, Washington State Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Files
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over $25,000 from 810 people on Kickstarter, Altius failed to make good
on its promise to provide investors with the advertised playing card
game.28 That lawsuit resulted in a default judgment.29 More recently, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sued Erik Chevalier and his business,
The Forking Path, for not delivering a promised board game.30 After
Chevalier raised over $122,000 from over 1200 backers, he announced
that he would not produce the intended board game and would instead
issue a refund to his investors.31 He failed to provide those refunds.32
The FTC settled with Chevalier, prohibiting him from making future
misrepresentations about crowdfunding and imposing a monetary
judgment.33
No doubt, the few instances of fraud that result from traditional
crowdfunding represent a small fraction of the total legitimate offerings.
Projects on Kickstarter alone have raised over $2 billion, spread across
more than 100,000 projects.34 Nonetheless, the prospect of fraud is real.
Perhaps even more important, however, is the concern that even
legitimate projects will result in substantial investor losses. Although it
is too early to judge whether or how many crowdfunded businesses will
succeed, there is reason for concern.35 Angel investing provides a useful
comparison. Research shows that angel investors rely on a small number

Lawsuit Against Company Behind Asylum Playing Cards Crowdfunded Project (May 1, 2014),
http://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/attorney-general-files-lawsuit-against-company-behindasylum-playing-cards [https://perma.cc/8JV2-28ML].
28. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 2, State v. Altius Mgmt., LLC, No. 14-2-12425SEA (King Cty. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 30, 2014), http://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/
uploadedfiles/AsylumComplaint%202014-05-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RB5-NVCS].
29. Default Judgment, Altius Mgmt., LLC, No. 14-2-12425-SEA (King Cty. Super. Ct. filed July
22,
2015),
http://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploadedfiles/Another/News/Press_
Releases/201507221452.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PLY-CS5X].
30. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Crowdfunding Project Creator Settles FTC Charges of
Deception (June 11, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/06/crowdfundingproject-creator-settles-ftc-charges-deception [https://perma.cc/4MLT-DGMY].
31. Complaint at 3, FTC v. Chevalier, No. 15-cv-01029-AC (D. Or. filed June 10, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150611chevaliercmpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
XQ2P-DLBN].
32. Id.
33. See Proposed Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 3–5, FTC
v. Chevalier, No. 15-cv-01029-AC (D. Or. filed June 10, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/cases/150611chevalierstip.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5SZ-4C9Z].
34. Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats [https://perma.cc/54AW-BVSN]
(last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
35. See generally Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493
(2014) (“The problem with equity crowdfunding is not the extent of disclosure. The problem is that
the companies that participate will be terrible prospects.”).
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of highly profitable investments to pull most of their portfolio’s weight:
the top ten percent of investments resulted in seventy-five percent of all
returns, while fifty-two percent lost money.36 Because the typical
crowdfunding investor lacks the angel investor’s expertise, ability to
diversify, and active participation in an investment strategy, she is much
less likely to find the hidden gems that make angel investing
worthwhile.37
What these anecdotes and figures suggest is not that crowdfunding
should be abandoned, but that it warrants caution. This Comment
explores the range of approaches states have taken to regulate
crowdfunding by identifying those provisions that appear insufficiently
protective of investors and proposing improvements to better protect
investors without overburdening small businesses. Part I provides basic
background information, starting with the original state blue sky laws
and continuing onto the federal Securities Act of 1933. By looking to the
prevailing rationale when those laws were passed, Part I suggests that
relaxed regulatory requirements in some new crowdfunding laws fail to
live up to historic standards. Part II discusses in some depth several
approaches different jurisdictions have taken when attempting to
regulate crowdfunding. That Part begins by laying out the provisions
contained in the JOBS Act itself and then continues on to explain
relevant portions of several state crowdfunding laws. Finally, Part III
focuses on two areas. First, it compares the various provisions contained
in state statutes with an emphasis on how both individual provisions and
the statutes as a whole seek to achieve investor protection. Second, it
uses these statutes as a baseline to argue that certain provisions should
be included within state-level crowdfunding statutes to adequately guard
against investor injury.
I.

SECURITIES LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES

In order to appreciate the importance of the changes taking place in
the crowdfunding space, it is important to start with a history of
securities regulation more generally. This Part begins by discussing state
securities laws and then moves to a summary of those laws’ federal
counterpart. Understanding how the securities laws came about
historically and function currently is important for two reasons. The first
is technical: because securities laws govern interstate commercial
transactions, state laws exist only to the extent allowed by the federal
36. Id. at 511.
37. Id. at 513–15.
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government.38 Briefly discussing this unique interplay is important to
understanding how state crowdfunding laws do and should function.
The second reason for describing securities laws in their historical
context is more normative. Kansas passed the first blue sky law as a
reaction to concerns about overly speculative investments;39 the federal
government followed suit a short time later. Other Depression-era
financial protections—particularly the Banking Act of 1933 (known as
Glass-Steagall)40—have been chipped away or repealed altogether, with
damaging results.41 The parallels between banking deregulation and
security deregulation are certainly not perfect, and the primary
protections provided by the Securities Act and Exchange Act are
undoubtedly still in place. Even so, the general principle remains valid:
important protections enacted by the people closest to a perceived harm
should not be drawn back carelessly. This Part begins with a discussion
of where those protections came from.
A.

The Beginnings of Securities Laws in the Kansas Blue Sky

Early American securities regulation was a creature of the states.42
Such regulation often focused on specific industries: the first, passed in
1852 in Massachusetts, required railroad companies to certify that
“reasonable parties” subscribed to their stock and paid a threshold of par
value.43 Before that, English securities laws placed limits on
stockbrokers and the filing of a prospectus with government officials
before any company could issue securities to the public.44 Even though
modern state statutes regulate a wider range of offerings than the early
statutes, most continue to focus on the offer and sale of securities rather
than attempt to impose subsequent registration requirements.45 Despite

38. See infra Section I.C.1.
39. See infra Section I.A.
40. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
41. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963 (2009)
(discussing how the repeal of Glass-Steagall in the 1990s gave rise to consolidation of the banking
and securities industries and resulted in the late-2000’s financial crisis).
42. See generally Rick A. Fleming, 100 Years of Securities Law: Examining a Foundation Laid
in the Kansas Blue Sky, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 586 (2011) (reviewing the development of state
securities laws).
43. Id. at 586.
44. Id.
45. JOSEPH C. LONG, 12 BLUE SKY LAW § 1:5 (2012).
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changes over time to the form of regulation in state securities law,46
much of the focus is still the same now as then: protecting investors
from fraudulent offerings.47
At the turn of the nineteenth century, America was in a period of
intense modernization. The era incubated a number of history-changing
inventions. New methods of communication, namely Thomas Edison’s
invention of the phonograph and motion picture, allowed Americans to
access a world previously unheard and unseen.48 New means of
transportation, from the Wright Brothers’ flight to Henry Ford’s Model
T, allowed Americans to experience that world in new and exciting
ways.49 For early twentieth century Americans, the sky was quite
literally the limit.
Exceptional technological change brought with it additional promises.
America’s lower classes at the time had suffered through difficult
working conditions, limited economic opportunity, and the prospect of
premature death.50 As these struggles slowly churned, organized labor
began to increase in popularity and the middle class started making itself
heard.51 The country had begun to recover from the depression of the
1890s with new, hopefully more stable corporate behemoths.52
Widespread growth and the success of heavy industries like rail and
manufacturing required access to ever-increasing sources of capital.53
The masses did not want to be left out. An onlooker observed that that
“[t]here seems to be something fascinating to the average citizen about a
proposition to buy stock in a company that is undertaking to build a
railroad, or dig a mine, or plant fields of rice and tobacco . . . .”54
Partially to tap into this growing demand for returns and partially to

46. See id. § 1:7.
47. See, e.g., A.S. Goldmen & Co. v. New Jersey Bureau of Sec., 163 F.3d 780, 781 (3d Cir.
1999) (“The purpose of these so-called ‘blue sky’ laws was to allow state authorities to prevent
unknowing buyers from being defrauded into buying securities that appeared valuable but in fact
were worthless.”).
48. MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 234 (2006).
49. See id. at 226–28.
50. See id. at 14.
51. Id. at 32, 39.
52. Daniel T. Rodgers, The Progressive Era to the New Era, 1900-1929, GILDER LEHRMAN INST.
AM. HIST., http://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/essays/progressive-era-new-era-1900-1929
[https://perma.cc/47LE-RBLV] (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
53. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347,
352–353 (1991).
54. Saving the People’s Money, 6 TICKER & INV. DIG. 156, 157 (1910).
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make real returns in the face of increasing inflation, business owners
began to offer interests in increasingly speculative ventures.55 Politicians
worried that the public’s fascination with investment would lead to
overly speculative investment and disproportionate losses.56
Accordingly, states wasted little time in crafting local protections. In
1911, Kansas passed the first modern securities statute.57 That law
allowed the state’s bank commissioner to block an offering that failed to
provide a “fair, just and equitable plan for the transaction of business.”58
Many followed Kansas’s lead: by 1931, all states but Nevada had
enacted similar laws.59
Although updated several times over the next few years, Kansas’s
original blue sky law was relatively straightforward.60 At four pages
long, the law succinctly governed activities of “investment companies”
that offered any of a variety of financial instruments to Kansas
residents.61 An issuer had to submit documents regarding its proposed
offering and future activities for review by the state bank commissioner,
who could accept or reject based on whether he “deem[ed] it
advisable.”62 This type of review would be dubbed “merit regulation.”63
55. See Macey & Miller, supra note 53, at 354–56 (“Speculative securities were typically ‘hyped’
by sales puffery that bordered on misrepresentation—and undoubtedly sometimes crossed the
line.”). One writer contemporaneously warned the investing public of overhyped schemes and “the
delusion of ‘easy money.’” Euphemia Holden, The Delusion of Sudden Riches, 83 BANKERS MAG.
186, 187 (1911).
56. See The Kansas Blue Sky Law, 75 CENT. L.J. 221, 222 (1912) (quoting Kansas bank
commissioner J.N. Dolley, drafter of the first blue sky law as saying that “where there has been one
dollar invested in mining, oil and gas stocks there has been 98 cents lost.”).
57. Act of March 10, 1911, ch. 133, 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210.
58. C.A. Dykstra, Notes on Current Legislation, 7 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 230, 231 (1913). At the
time, Kansas’s bank commissioner, J.N. Dolley, was also its most ardent blue sky law advocate. See
Fleming, supra note 42, at 595–97 (2011). Although this dual role suggests that Dolley’s support for
securities regulation could have been based on ulterior motives, Fleming argues that, while possible,
such an “explanation is far too simplistic because it fails to explain the wide popular appeal of the
blue sky law and other banking reforms.” Id. at 597.
59. Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses, 46
J.L. & ECON. 229, 232 (2003).
60. The term “blue sky law” allegedly comes from a scheme by Chicago salespeople who
marketed a rain-making machine to drought-stricken Kansas farmers. Fleming, supra note 42, at
585. When the machine inevitably failed, the salesmen left with cash and without fulfilling their
promise. From that rouse came the term: “it refers to an investment opportunity in which the
promoter promises rain but delivers blue sky.” Id. at 586.
61. Id. at 601.
62. Id. at 602.
63. Merit regulation is defined as:
[A] regulatory system that authorizes state administrators to deny registration to a securities
offering unless the substantive terms of the offering and the associated transactions (i) ensure a
fair relation between promoters and public investors, and (ii) provide public investors with a
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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The Theories Behind Modern Securities Regulation

Merit regulation is one of two dominant philosophies of securities
regulation. Although less popular than in the years immediately
following the adoption of the first blue sky law, major states like
California64 and Texas65 continue to utilize merit-based review. By
contrast, a significantly more permissive approach requires no state-level
registration and uses antifraud protections alone. Only New York’s
Martin Act66 applies this model. In between, some states have matched
the federal approach, which mandates pre-offering disclosure.67 A fourth
model, and the most popular, combines disclosure requirements with
merit review.
For most jurisdictions, one of these philosophies has been inserted
within the provisions of the Uniform Securities Act.68 Currently used in
some fashion in forty-three states and territories,69 the Uniform Act was
reasonable relation of risk to return. While merit and disclosure regulation should not be
regarded as antitheses, merit regulation differs from disclosure regulation in its direct
regulation of the internal structure of a securities issuer, of the relations among insiders and
outsiders, and of the terms of the offering.
Mark A. Sargent, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 785, 829
(1986). The underlying substantive goal of merit regulation—to promote an offering’s fairness—is
reached by, first, preventing promoters from acquiring a company’s stock at depressed prices prior
to its offering and, second, protecting the public against exploitation from underwriters who seek
excessive fees. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky
Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553, 563–67 (1985). For an additional discussion of merit regulation, see
Ronald J. Colombo, Merit Regulation via the Suitability Rules, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 1 (2013).
64. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (“The commissioner
may issue a stop order denying . . . any qualification of an underwritten offering of securities . . . if
he or she finds (A) that the order is in the public interest and (B) that the proposed plan of business
of the issuer or the proposed issuance or sale of securities is not fair, just, or equitable . . . .”).
65. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-7(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“No
dealer or agent shall sell or offer for sale any securities . . . until the issuer of such securities or a
dealer registered under the provisions of this Act shall have been granted a permit by the
Commissioner.”).
66. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 343 (McKinney 2016) (“Whenever it shall appear to the attorneygeneral, either upon complaint or otherwise, that in [the sale of a security], any person . . . shall have
employed . . . any [fraudulent scheme], he may in his discretion either require or permit such
person . . . to file with him a statement in writing under oath or otherwise as to all the facts and
circumstances concerning the subject matter which he believes it is to the public interest to
investigate . . . .”).
67. See infra Section I.B.
68. LONG, supra note 45, § 1:7.
69. These jurisdictions include the District of Columbia, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. A
breakdown shows that twenty jurisdictions base their laws on the 1956 Uniform Act, four on the
1985 Act, nineteen on the 2002 act, and ten are not modeled after any version. Pamela M. Heinrich,
U.S. Survey: State Adoption of Uniform Securities Act, NAT’L ASS’N FOR FIXED ANNUITIES,
http://www.nafa.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/20120920-NAFA-Uniform-Security-Act-
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promulgated in 1956,70 revised first in 1985,71 and then revised a second
time in 2002.72 The Uniform Act, as well as all independent blue sky
laws other than New York’s, employs three primary regulatory elements:
securities registration, intermediary regulation, and antifraud
enforcement.73 State securities laws, the Uniform Act included, are
concerned predominantly with offers and sales of securities as well as
the supervision of securities professionals, rather than with ongoing
reporting requirements and secondary market transactions.74 The drafters
of the Uniform Act—the first model legislation of its kind in the
securities field75—formatted their model in a way that allows adopting
states to choose among standalone provisions for any of the three
regulatory areas.76
Registration of securities, the first area of concern for most states and
the topic this Comment focuses on, requires issuers to submit materials
to a state administrator. The Uniform Act allows for three different
forms of registration, balancing the need to protect investors against a
desire to limit redundancy and excess costs for potential issuers.77 The
first, registration by coordination, allows a registration statement filed
pursuant to a federal offering in compliance with the Securities Act to
qualify at the state level.78 Second, registration by filing is most useful
for larger companies which already have shares outstanding.79 Finally,
Adoption_At-A-Glance.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2NV-ZNEA] (last updated Oct. 12, 2012).
70. UNIF. SEC. ACT (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 748 (2006).
71. UNIF. SEC. ACT (amended 1988), 7C U.L.A. 221 (2006).
72. UNIF. SEC. ACT (amended 2002), 7C U.L.A. 20 (2006).
73. See ROBERT N. RAPP, BLUE SKY REGULATION 1-2 to 1-7 (2003). In this context,
“registration” refers to process issuers have to go through in order to sell securities to investors;
registration almost always requires submission of designated information to the relevant
administrator. Id. at 1-3.
74. Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory
Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REV. 1027, 1030 (1987).
75. See RAPP, supra note 73, at 1-20. Rapp notes that, although the Uniform Sales of Securities
Act was released in 1929, it managed to gain minimal traction and the passage of the Securities Act
of 1933 rendered it obsolete. Id. at 1-20 n.10.
76. The provisions, although now slightly reorganized, were labeled as: Part I for fraudulent
practices, UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 101–02 (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 749 (2006); Part II for
intermediary registration and regulation, id. §§ 201–04, 7C U.L.A. 777; and Part III for registration
of securities, id. §§ 301–06, 7C U.L.A. 793. The final Part IV contains sections for definitions,
exemptions, and criminal and civil penalties among others. Id. §§ 401–20, 7C U.L.A. 817.
77. See The Uniform Securities Act, 12 STAN. L. REV. 105, 106 (1959) (“[P]aper work would be
minimized if the federal prospectus were used by state administrators as their basic source of
information.”).
78. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 303 (amended 2002), 7C U.L.A. 81 (2006).
79. Id. § 302, 7C U.L.A. 74.
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registration by qualification—the most onerous of the three—is provided
for issuers unable to qualify under the previous two methods.80 Although
in these sections the Uniform Act continues to empower administrators
to exercise a form of merit review, the revised version has followed the
trend ongoing in many states to expand certain exemptions to facilitate
offerings in limited circumstances.81
C.

The Federal Approach to Small-Dollar Securities Regulation: The
Securities Act of 1933 and Its Exemptions

The excitement that led to the passage of state securities laws presents
a stark contrast with the misery that preceded the federal securities laws.
Rather than the relative prosperity of the early years of the 1900s and the
perceived need to protect eager investors, federal securities laws were
drafted as a response to the 1929 stock market crash and subsequent
Great Depression.82 Although the federal securities laws were originally
modeled after the merit-based review used in many states, President
Roosevelt rejected merit review as overly paternalistic.83
Instead, the Securities Act of 193384 attempts to protect investors by
mandating information disclosure and prohibiting fraudulent practices.85
Disclosure is achieved through section 5, which requires that prospective
issuers file a registration statement for the SEC to review,86 file a public
statement,87 and to wait a mandatory period before securities can be

80. Id. § 304, 7C U.L.A. 84.
81. See RAPP, supra note 73, at 1-21 n.17 (noting exclusion from merit review for “seasoned”
issuers in section 302(a) and an expanded limited offering exemption in section 402(11)). These
exemptions, updated in the most recent revision of the Uniform Act to account for the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012), are not generally relevant
here. For a list of the included exemptions, see RAPP, supra note 73, at 7-10 to 7-13.
82. Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and the Case for
Federal Merit Review, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 678 (2010).
83. Id. at 679. The President made a statement regarding the first version of the Securities Act of
1933, explaining that:
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which might be
construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the sense that
their value will be maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities to be
sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and information . . . .
H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 77a–77aa.
85. MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 163 (5th ed. 2009).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 77f.
87. Id. § 77e(c).
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sold.88 Through these disclosures, legislators hoped to provide investors
with enough information to ensure an informed investment decision.89
Although the SEC does not verify the truth of the registered
information,90 section 11 provides the Act with significant teeth to
combat fraud.91
The Securities Act’s disclosure requirements and antifraud provisions
were a response to a clear problem with state securities regulation.
Because blue sky antifraud protections could not reach beyond state
borders,92 waves of securities fraud victimized investors in the late 1910s
and again in the 1920s.93 In addition, a single federal securities
regulatory scheme created efficiencies impossible to achieve with a
piecemeal system.94 Under pure state-based securities laws, when a
fraudulent issuer sold securities to the residents of several states, any
subsequent lawsuits were likely to result in inconsistent decisions and
legal standards.95
Even so, Congress understood the need for continued state regulation.
Not only did the 1933 Act expressly retain the states’ ability to protect
local investors,96 but it also created an intrastate exemption where state
regulations alone would operate.97 Indeed, Congress has since expressed
a desire for additional federal-state coordination.98 To that end, state
laws continue to play an important role in ensuring that the entire

88. Id. § 77h(a).
89. STEINBERG, supra note 85, at 163.
90. Id.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
92. See Daniel J. McCauley, Jr., Intrastate Securities Transactions Under the Federal Securities
Act, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 937, 941 (1959) (“Federal securities legislation was enacted, among other
reasons, to supplement state regulation by closing the door to interstate transactions as to which
state regulation was being frustrated.”); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual
Regulation of Securities: A Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REV. 495, 515–16 (1984) (noting
that the success of state securities regimes “led unscrupulous promoters to develop schemes to elude
the reach of process through the use of interstate facilities.”).
93. Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP.
L. 1, 18 (1983).
94. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 697–98 (1984).
95. Id.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (“[N]othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities
commission . . . of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the
provisions of this chapter.”); Id. § 78bb(a) (providing the same).
97. Id. § 77c; see also infra Section I.B.1.
98. Id. § 77s(d)(1).
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regulatory system functions.99 Because of state support, federal
securities regulators and federal courts have been able to reduce the
scope of their investigations and allow state systems to pick up the slack.
This has included a trend to reduce the number of securities cases heard
in the federal system.100 In contrast, state courts have tended to expand
their definition of what activities qualify for regulation by blue sky
laws.101 Not only do local agencies help the SEC shoulder a substantial
regulatory burden, but they also provide regulatory innovations useful to
the entire system.102 Equity crowdfunding, the subject of this Comment,
provides but one example.
In part because of the added layer of security provided by state-level
protections and in part because of its concern with balancing fraud
protection with capital formation,103 the Commission has created several
exemptions from the typical disclosure requirements. Categorized as
either “Exempted Securities” in section 3 or “Exempted Transactions” in
section 4,104 issuers using an exemption are not required to follow the
section 5 disclosure requirements.105 The exempted securities listed in
section 3 are excluded based on “the intrinsic nature of the issuer or the
character of the security itself.”106 This includes, among others: short99. Sargent, supra note 74, at 1060–66 (responding in the affirmative to “whether state disclosure
regulation plays a positive role in the allocation of regulatory responsibilities between the states and
the SEC”).
100. LONG, supra note 45, § 1:7. This trend has been similarly facilitated by congressional action,
with the passage of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 providing one example. See
Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of
Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273 (1998) (“A consequence of the Act . . . was to shift a significant
portion of securities fraud class action litigation from federal to state court.”).
101. LONG, supra note 45, § 1:7; see, e.g., Stanley v. Commercial Courier Serv., Inc., 411 F.
Supp. 818, 823 (D. Or. 1975) (finding that a franchising scheme was not a security under federal
law, but was under Oregon state law).
102. Sargent, supra note 74, at 1066.
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (“[T]he Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection
of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (Section 3); 15 U.S.C. § 77d (Section 4). In addition to the specific
provisions in that section, section 3(b) states that “[t]he Commission may from time to time by its
rules and regulations . . . add any class of securities to the securities exempted as provided in this
section, if it finds that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount
involved or the limited character of the public offering; but no issue of securities shall . . . exceed[]
$5,000,000.” Id. § 77(c)(b)(1).
105. See id. § 77e (exempting the securities listed in “the provisions of section 77c or 77d of this
title.”). None of these exemptions, however, protect the issuer against fraud liability prescribed by
the Securities Act. Id. § 77q.
106. J. WILLIAM HICKS, 7 EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, at 117 (2003). Not all of the securities listed in section 3 are treated as exempted securities: only
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term commercial promissory notes;107 securities issued by nonprofit,
religious, educational, or charitable organizations;108 and securities of
building and loan or farmer cooperatives.109 Because the exemption is
seen to apply to the security itself rather than the issuing transaction, an
issuer must comply only with the terms of the specific exemption.110 In
contrast, the transactional exemption afforded to the rest of section 3 and
the entirety of section 4 applies more narrowly. Because that exemption
applies to a specific transaction alone, subsequent resale transactions
must not only comply with registration requirements, but the issuer must
follow the exemption’s conditions for the duration of the offering.111
Of these two categories, transactional exemptions are more
commonly used in the small business context.112 The following
exemptions are particularly relevant to facilitating small business capital
formation.113 The first, the “intrastate exemption,” was a product of the
original Securities Act and expressly maintains state authority to govern
securities within state boarders. The second and third are regulatory
exemptions issued by the SEC based on the discretion extended to it by
section 3(b) of the Securities Act, which allows the Commission
considerable leeway in dealing with small offerings.114

sections 3(a)(2) through 3(a)(8) receive that special distinction. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2)–(a)(8). The
remaining portions of section 3 are classified as exempt transactions like those in section 4. HICKS,
supra, at 1-17.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3).
108. Id. § 77c(a)(4).
109. Id. § 77c(a)(5).
110. HICKS, supra note 106, at 1-17.
111. Id. at 1-17 to 1-18. In an intrastate offering, for example, all securities sold must “come to
rest” in the hands of state residents. Because this requirement means the actual transaction could last
for up to a year after the issuer sells its final security, the issuer does not comply with the
exemption’s technical requirements until after passing through that resting period. Id. at 1-18.
112. See Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses’ Search for “A Moderate
Capital,” 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 92–99 (2006) (discussing the various exemptions available to
small businesses: intrastate offerings, private placements, and Regulation D).
113. Other safe harbors not discussed here include Regulation A, see id. at 111-21 (discussing use
of and prescribing changes for Regulation A), as well as a variety of niche safe harbors not broadly
applicable. See HICKS, supra note 106, at 1-16.1 to 1-17 (listing exempted securities); id. at 1-25 to
1-33 (discussing and categorizing exempted transaction).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (“The Commission may . . . add any class of securities to the securities
exempted as provided in this section, if it finds that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect
to such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason
of the small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering; but no issue of
securities shall . . . [exceed] $5,000,000.”).
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The Intrastate Exemption and Rule 147 Safe Harbor

The intrastate exemption, section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act,115
carves from the federal disclosure requirements an exemption that
requires issuers to comply only with state law. The exemption allows
smaller issuers to sell securities through a local financing plan, under a
theory that investors would be protected by their proximity to the issuer
and that state’s blue sky law.116 The requirements to qualify for this
exemption include: (1) the issuer must be a resident of or incorporated in
the state; (2) the issuer must conduct a substantial amount of its business
within the state; (3) the proceeds of the offering must be used within the
state; (4) the offerees and purchasers must be residents of that state; (5)
securities offered through the transaction must come to rest in persons
residing in the state; and (6) the entire securities issuance must be made
pursuant to the section 3(a)(11) exemption.117 Failure to comply with
each of these requirements defeats the exemption and could result in
civil liability and other sanctions for the issuer.118
Although seemingly straightforward, uncertainty regarding how the
SEC would define and police the section’s terms prompted further
explanation. The result was Rule 147,119 adopted in January 1974, which
clarifies but does not replace the statutory standard.120 With regards to
residence of the issuer, Rule 147 repeatedly applies an eighty percent
standard: eighty percent of the business’s gross revenues during the last
fiscal year must come from the state;121 eighty percent of its assets, along
with its principal office, must be located in the state;122 and eighty

115. Id. § 77c(a)(11).
116. Notice of Adoption of Rule 147 Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release
No. 5450, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 2340 (Jan. 7, 1974) [hereinafter Rule 147 Release].
117. HICKS, supra note 106, at 4-4. See generally Section 3(a)(11) Exemption for Local
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶2270 (Dec. 6, 1961)
(discussing the requirements to qualify for the intrastate exemption).
118. These sanctions can include an injunction prohibiting further distributions of securities
without registering, requiring an offer of redemption for all prior securities transactions, and
recommendation of criminal prosecution. HICKS, supra note 106, at 4-6 n.10.
119. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2016).
120. If any issuer fails to qualify under Rule 147, it is technically possible to qualify under the
less-well-defined intrastate exemption. See Rule 147 Release, supra note 116 (“The rule is a
nonexclusive rule. However, persons who choose to rely on section 3(a)(11) without complying
with all the conditions of the rule would have the burden of establishing that they have complied
with the judicial and administrative interpretations of section 3(a)(11) in effect at the time of the
offering.”).
121. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(4)(c)(2)(i).
122. Id. § 230.147(4)(c)(2)(ii).
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percent of the offering’s net proceeds must be used in the state.123 The
Rule maintains the requirement that all offerees and purchasers must be
state residents, interpreted to mean that the individual’s “principal
residence” is within state boundaries.124 Finally, the rule prohibits
purchasers from reselling to anyone not a resident of the state and from
reselling securities for the nine months after the final sale of that issue.125
2.

Regulation D and Rule 504

Regulation D was the SEC’s response to economic hardship among
the American small business community during the 1970s.126 During
three weeks in the spring of 1978, the Commission held public hearings
in order to better “determin[e] the extent to which the burdens imposed
on small businesses by the federal securities law could be alleviated
consistent with the protection of investors.”127 The result was three new
safe harbors and six total rules that updated the then-existing safe
harbors for small issuers.128
Regulation D is structured by listing generally applicable
requirements first, followed by three substantive safe harbors. Rule 501
contains definitions, including one for “accredited investor,” which
includes individuals with over $1 million in net worth outside of their
primary residence,129 over $200,000 in income alone, or $300,000 in
income together with a spouse.130 Rule 502 restricts the allowed “manner
of offering” by prohibiting general solicitation and advertising as well as
resale of the purchased securities.131 Finally, Rule 503 requires the issuer

123. Id. § 230.147(4)(c)(2)(iii).
124. Id. § 230.147(4)(d)(2).
125. Id. § 230.147(4)(e).
126. J. WILLIAM HICKS, 7a EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, at
7-14 (2003).
127. Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited
Offers & Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, [1981–1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982).
128. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.506; see Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the
Registration Provisions of the Sec. Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Ltd. Offers & Sales,
Securities Act Release No. 6339, [1981–1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,014,
at 84,457 (Aug. 7, 1981) [hereinafter Exemption Revision Release]. Subsequently, the enforcement
mechanisms were added in Rules 507 and 508 to complete the series of rules which today make up
Regulation D. The goal of the new rules was to “simplify and clarify existing exemptions, to expand
their availability, and to achieve uniformity between Federal and state exemptions.” Id. The
rescinded exemptions were codified as Rules 146, 240, and 242. Id.
129. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5).
130. Id. § 230.501(a)(6).

15 - Pierce-Wright.docx (Do Not Delete)

5/30/2016 3:52 PM

864

[Vol. 91:847

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

to file a notice of offering with the SEC.132
Of the substantive safe harbors, the most relevant to state
crowdfunding is Rule 504.133 Derived from the SEC’s power in section
3(b), Rule 504 was intended to create a “clear and workable exemption
for small offerings by small issuers to be regulated by state ‘Blue Sky’
requirements.”134 To that end, the SEC has attempted to coordinate
federal and state requirements. Although Rule 504 incorporates the
solicitation and resale restrictions noted above, an issuer receives an
exemption from those requirements if it either registers its offering
pursuant to an applicable blue sky law or offers its securities to
accredited investors alone.135 The safe harbor, which originally capped
its offerings to $500,000,136 now allows for offerings of up to $1 million
within a twelve-month period.137
D.

Securities Regulation and Federalism: State Action in a
Federally-Dominated Field

In an area dominated by federal statutes and regulations, states play a
diminished but still-important role in encouraging capital formation and
protecting investors.138 This role has long been expressly recognized in
federal law,139 with the federal government intending to leverage local
experience with securities regulation when it developed its own
regulatory system in the 1930s.140 As noted above, the federal version
has emphasized disclosure as a means of investor protection, while many
131. Id. § 230.502(c) (prohibiting general solicitation, including “[a]ny advertisement, article,
notice or other communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast
over television or radio”); id.§ 230.502(d).
132. Id. § 230.503(a).
133. The two other substantive safe harbors under Regulation D are Rules 505 and 506. Briefly
stated, Rule 505 allows an issuer to raise up to $5 million within a twelve-month period from an
unlimited number of accredited investors and up to thirty-five non-accredited investors. Rule 506
allows an issuer to raise an unlimited amount of money from an unlimited number of accredited and
up to thirty-five non-accredited investors. See HICKS, supra note 126, at 7-22 to 7-24.
134. Exemption Revision Release, supra note 128.
135. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b).
136. Exemption Revision Release, supra note 128.
137. 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(b)(2).
138. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (preserving, among other things, the right of state securities
commissions to “retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to investigate and bring
enforcement actions”); supra notes 111–25 and accompanying text (discussing the federal intrastate
exemption and the Rule 147 safe harbor).
140. Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 112 (2005).
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states employ merit review.141 Despite the added protection against
securities fraud and other abuses, the dual system was criticized as
inefficient and unnecessarily burdensome on issuers who needed to
comply with both federal and state requirements.142
Over time, lawmakers began to address state-federal coordination
issues by implementing a more uniform system at the state level.143 This
process included the promulgation of the Uniform Securities Act in
1956,144 the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption in 1983,145 and the
creation of a Small Corporate Offering Registration (SCOR) form in
1989.146 Even with these changes, the securities industry voiced
dissatisfaction with the slow pace of reform and the system’s persistent
redundancies.147 The result of this continued discontent was, among
other things, the National Securities Markets Improvement Act
(NSMIA), passed in 1996.148 NSMIA reduced the regulatory burden
141. Compare supra Section I.B (discussing merit review used in some states), with supra
Section I.C (discussing disclosure required by the federal Securities Act); see also Jeffrey D.
Chadwick, Comment, Proving Preemption by Proving Exemption: The Quandary of the National
Securities Market Improvement Act, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 765, 768 (2009) (“Though theoretically
opposed, the two philosophies were designed to work together to avoid the pitfalls that precipitated
the 1929 crash.”).
142. See Jones, supra note 140, at 112; Chadwick, supra note 141, at 769.
143. For a discussion of the changes in state and federal law aimed at increasing uniformity, see
Kenneth I. Denos, Blue and Gray Skies: The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996
Makes the Case for Uniformity in State Securities Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 101, and Rutheford B
Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 175
(1997).
144. UNIF. SEC. ACT (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 748 (2006).
145. Uniform
Limited
Offering
Exemption,
NASAA
Rep.
(CCH)
¶6201,
http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/UNIFORM-LIMITED-OFFERINGEXEMPTION.pdf [https://perma.cc/U53Y-BSK4]. This uniform law was intended to provide a
template for state to copy, in order to facilitate coordination of state and federal securities
exemptions and thereby benefit small businesses. Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D:
Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 248–49
(1990).
146. See SCOR Overview, NORTH AM. SEC. ADMINS. ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.org/industryresources/corporation-finance/scor-overview/ [https://perma.cc/D4DY-L5AH] (last visited Jan. 16,
2016) (“The Form was designed for use by companies seeking to raise capital through a public
offering of securities exempt from registration with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) under [Rule 504 and section 3(a)(11), among others].”).
147. Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the
United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495, 508 (2003).
148. National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). State law was also preempted in the 1990s
by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), which precluded state courts from hearing
class actions in connection with a security sold on a national exchange. For a more thorough
discussion of the SLUSA, see Selby P. Brown, Don’t Throw the Baby out with the Bath Water: The
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placed on issuers by precluding states from requiring securities
registration, conducting merit review, and requiring delivery of preoffering prospectuses for “covered securities.”149 These securities
include, among others, those of companies listed on national exchanges
or NASDAQ, securities sold pursuant to transactions exempt from
registration—for example, under the section 4(a)(2) exemption and
related Regulation D safe harbor, or under the section 4(a)(6)
crowdfunding exemption—and sales made to “qualified purchasers,” as
defined by the SEC rule.150
Even with the enactment of NSMIA and other preemptive federal
laws, state securities laws remain an important element of securities
regulation. As a legal matter, courts have made clear that Congress did
not intend to occupy the field of securities regulation generally,151 and
Congress has explicitly stated when it intends to preempt states.152 As a
practical matter, states have been important players in combating
fraud.153 In the early 2000s, for example, New York used the threat of
liability under its Martin Act to compel Merrill Lynch to separate its
securities research and investment banking divisions.154 Regulation of
Wall Street is the most prominent, but not the only, example of the
importance of state protections. Despite federal securities regulation’s
increased presence, state enforcement of securities laws is essential
when, for example, an issuer decides to use the safe harbor under Rule
147.155

Merits of the Intermediate Approach to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, 66 OKLA.
L. REV. 363 (2014).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1)(A) (2012).
150. Id. § 77r(b); see also Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35
DEL. J. CORP. L. 151, 154 (2010). The SEC later clarified that “qualified purchasers” would be
limited to “large accredited investors”—legal entities with assets of at least $10 million or
individuals with at least $2.5 million in investments or $400,000 in individual income. Revisions of
Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 8828, [2007 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,939, 85,174 (Aug. 3, 2007).
151. See, e.g., Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1107 (4th Cir. 1989);
N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 582 (9th Cir. 1983).
152. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a), with id. § 77p(b).
153. See Christine A. Bruenn, NASAA President, Testimony Before the United States Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs: Wall Street Analyst Conflicts of Interest
Global Settlement (May 7, 2003), http://www.nasaa.org/882/wall-street-analyst-conflicts-ofinterest-global-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/4SFP-SQKD] (discussing the states’ roles in the
investigation of Wall Street practices in the early 2000s).
154. See Karmel, supra note 147, at 519–22.
155. See supra notes 94–105 and accompanying text.
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EXISTING CROWDFUNDING LEGISLATION AT THE
FEDERAL AND STATE LEVEL

The SEC’s goals—to protect investors, maintain efficient markets,
and facilitate capital formation156—are inherently at odds. Mandated
disclosure and merit review attempt to provide investors with
information and weed out bad actors, but at a significant cost to issuers.
Nowhere is that tension more acutely felt than in the small business
community, where businesses lack sufficient economies of scale to make
up for the cost of a registered offering.157 Both state and federal
securities laws create an environment in which transactional and
structural burdens on small-dollar offerings are frequently costprohibitive.158
This problem bears out in actions taken by regulators. On the one
hand, it is easy to extol the benefits of strong small business
performance. In a recent annual SEC Forum on Small Business Capital
Formation, Commissioner Luis Aguilar commented that “the success of
small businesses is essential to the sustained growth of our greater
economy.”159 He added that between 1993 and 2013, “[s]mall firms were
responsible for 63 percent of the net new jobs created” in America.160 On
the other hand, the SEC has been a reluctant partner in efforts to
facilitate small-dollar capital formation. Repeated comments about the
importance of this subset of the American economy have been followed
up with “[p]recious little attention . . . to the more numerous and difficult
concerns faced by small companies seeking to raise capital through
exemption from registration.”161 The frustration among the small
business community and its supporters culminated in a groundswell of
support for the JOBS Act.162
156. What
We
Do,
U.S.
SEC.
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#.VNEgd_54rN8 [https://perma.cc/4K6G-ZQMC] (last
modified June 10, 2013).
157. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The New Regulation of Small Business Capital Formation: The
Impact-If Any-of the Jobs Act, 102 KY. L.J. 815, 817–18 (2014) (describing how the limited size of
many small business’s capital needs results in substantial fixed transaction costs and how securities
regulation impedes small-dollar offerings).
158. Campbell, supra note 157, at 817–18.
159. Record of Proceedings, 33rd Annual Securities and Exchange Commission GovernmentBusiness Forum on Small Business Capital Formation 16 (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/sbforum112014-final-transcript.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UN9MKVB8].
160. Id.
161. Cohn & Yadley, supra note 10, at 4.
162. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in
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This Part discusses statutory crowdfunding legislation and regulation
passed at the federal and state levels. The Part begins with a discussion
of Title III of the JOBS Act, which allows companies to conduct smalldollar offerings in a limited disclosure regime. It then uses three statelevel analogs to demonstrate the range of local alternatives: Indiana’s
exemption, which allows issuers to raise up to $2 million; Maryland’s
exemption, which limits issuers to $100,000; and a model act
promulgated by the North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA), an association of state securities administrators.
A.

Crowdfunding and the JOBS Act

Signed into law in April of 2012, the JOBS Act was characterized as
“attempt[ing] to create jobs by making it easier for America’s
entrepreneurs to raise startup and growth capital.”163 Although the Act
contains several provisions that concern relatively large private
businesses, Title III focuses exclusively on allowing small issuers to
conduct offerings over the internet.164 Known as the CROWDFUND
Act,165 Title III adds an exempted transaction to the Securities Act in a
newly created section 4(a)(6).166
This exemption takes after traditional private crowdfunding platforms
like Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and Kiva. Those websites and others connect
entrepreneurs with anyone willing to receive an in-kind return, a gradual
reimbursement of their original donation, or the satisfaction of
supporting a cause in exchange for a small investment.167 Because the
transactions on these websites do not involve a “security” as defined by
various Supreme Court opinions,168 their activities are not covered by
securities regulation. Until recently, however, both securities registration
requirements and limitations on selling to unaccredited investors all but
prohibited most investors from obtaining equity in non-public
businesses.169
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
163. 158 CONG. REC. E517 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2012) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
164. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act §§ 301–305, 126 Stat. at 315–23.
165. An acronym for the Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical NonDisclosure Act of 2012.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012).
167. See Bradford, supra note 5, at 10–27 (discussing crowdfunding generally and listing five
different varieties).
168. See id. at 31–41 (discussing how each type of crowdfunding is treated under securities
regulation).
169. See id. at 24–27.
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The Title III exemption was intended to pave the way for equity
crowdfunding.170 One of the more novel elements of Title III is its
express endorsement of the “funding portal,” an online tool that mimics
the websites used by non-equity, web-based crowdfunding.171 Issuers
that engage in equity crowdfunding must utilize an intermediary, in the
form of either an online “funding portal” or broker, to facilitate the
transaction.172 In part because these intermediaries function as a funnel
for all potential crowdfunding offerings, Title III utilizes them as a
source of investor protection and a prophylactic against fraud. Funding
portals as an alternative intermediary to a broker is a new addition.
Funding portals are exempted from broker-dealer registration
requirements established by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act),173 but they must nonetheless register with the SEC and
a self-regulatory organization (SRO).174 They must also comply with a
series of statutory requirements: refrain from offering investment advice;
avoid soliciting purchases, sales, or offers or securities; not compensate
employees based on sale of securities on its website; not handle investor
funds or securities; and follow other rules as determined by the SEC.175
In addition, funding portals are required to help inform investors
about the risks inherent in this type of investment176 and provide
additional education materials.177 The SEC recognized the importance of
170. See 158 CONG. REC. S2230 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Brown) (“The
CROWDFUND Act sets the framework for developing a new market in which entrepreneurs can
raise capital and ordinary investors can invest in new ideas.”).
171. A funding portal acts as an intermediary in a crowdfunding transaction but cannot do the
following:
(A) offer investment advice or recommendations; (B) solicit purchases, sales, or offers to buy
the securities offered or displayed on its website or portal; (C) compensate employees, agents,
or other persons for such solicitation or based on the sale of securities displayed or referenced
on its website or portal; (D) hold, manage, possess, or otherwise handle investor funds or
securities; or (E) engage in such other activities as the Commission, by rule, determines
appropriate.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80).
172. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(C).
173. Id. § 78c(h)(1).
174. Id. § 77d-1(a)(1), (2). Registered funding portals receive an exemption from the application
of local legal requirements to the extent that those requirements are “in addition to or different from
the requirements for registered funding portals established by the Commission.” Id. § 78o(i)(2)(B).
Under its proposed rule, the SEC identified the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) as
a particular self-regulatory organization that intermediaries could register with; that specific
reference was removed in the final rule. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,429 (Nov. 16,
2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, & 274).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80).
176. Id. § 77d-1(a)(4).
177. Id. § 77d-1(a)(3).
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education as an investor protection tool.178 The agency supplemented the
Act’s statutory language with specific requirements “relating to the risks
of investing in securities offered and sold . . . , investors’ cancellation
rights, resale restrictions and issuer reporting,” among others.179 The
rules specify that individual intermediaries may determine the context of
materials other than minimum requirements as well as the manner of
presentation.180 Finally, intermediaries must gather information about
issuers, including conducting background checks on an issuer’s officers,
directors, and shareholders with a greater than twenty percent stake in
the business.181
Title III then continues with restrictions on issuers. Issuers are limited
to raising a maximum of $1 million of securities within a twelve-month
period.182 The SEC clarified in its final rule that this dollar figure will be
based solely on offerings made in reliance on the crowdfunding
exemption, despite the statutory language that the limit applies to the
“aggregate amount sold to all investors by the issuer.”183
All issuers must also provide basic information to potential
investors.184 Importantly, disclosure requirements vary based on the
amount an issuer wishes to raise: if the amount is less than $100,000,
then the issuer’s income taxes for the most recent year as well as
financial statements certified by the principal executive officer must be
disclosed; if the amount is between $100,000 and $500,000, then
financial statements must be reviewed by an independent accountant; if
the amount is greater than $500,000, then audited financial statements
must be disclosed.185 Finally, issuers cannot engage in any advertising

178. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,390 (including investor education among the protective
functions that intermediaries serve).
179. Id. at 71,439.
180. Id. The SEC rejected some commenters’ suggestions for additional information, including
materials about how to evaluate investment in privately held companies. Id. at 71,439–40. The SEC
reasoned that, although helpful, it was not persuaded that such information “would significantly
strengthen the investor protections” provided under the rules. Id. at 71,440.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(5).
182. Id. § 77d(a)(6).
183. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,391 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012)).
184. This information includes: the names of the business’s officers, directors, and shareholders
with over twenty percent interest, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(B), a description of its business along
with a business plan, id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(C), a description of the intended use of the offering’s
proceeds, id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(E), a description of the business’s ownership and capital structure, id.
§ 77d-1(b)(1)(H), and at least annual financial statements to both investors and the SEC, id. § 77d1(b)(4).
185. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D).
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other than to point potential investors to the funding portal or broker.186
Title III also attempts to protect investors by limiting their exposure
to losses and empowering their ability to fight back against fraudulent
issuers. Within a twelve month period, a single individual is limited to
investing in one company either: (i) the greater of $2000 or five percent
of their annual income or net worth if their income or net worth is less
than $100,000; or (ii) ten percent of their annual income or net worth, up
to $100,000, if their income or net worth exceeds $100,000.187 The Act
also prohibits resale to anyone within one year after the date of purchase
other than the issuer itself, accredited investors, family members, or as
part of a registered offering.188 Investors are also able to bring their own
claims against any issuer189 that makes a material untrue statement or
omits a material fact during the offering or sale of a crowdfunding
security.190
Although Title III sets out more than a bare outline of legal
requirements, it also directed the SEC to engage in supplementary
rulemaking.191 That rulemaking—required to occur within 270 days after
President Obama signed the JOBS Act,192 or by January 2013—lagged
woefully behind schedule. The SEC did not issue a proposed rule until
late 2013,193 and that proposal finally became official in October
2015.194 This unanticipated delay prevented the creation of any funding
portals or initiation of crowdfunding actions based on the federal
exemption.
B.

State-Level Crowdfunding Response

While federal regulators failed to take action, state legislators had
begun to fill the void. Before Congress passed the JOBS Act, only two
186. Id. § 77d-1(b)(2).
187. Id. § 77d(a)(6).
188. Id. § 77d-1(e)(1).
189. Defined as “any person who is a director or partner of the issuer, and the principal executive
officer or officers, principal financial officer, and controller or principal accounting officer of the
issuer . . . that offers or sells a security in a transaction exempted by the provisions of section 4(6).”
Id. § 77d-1(c)(3).
190. Id. § 77d-1(e)(2)(A).
191. See, e.g., id. § 77d-1(a)(5) (requiring intermediaries to “take such measures to reduce the
risk of fraud . . . as established by the Commission, by rule”); id. § 77d-1(b)(5) (requiring issuers to
“comply with such other requirements as the Commission may, by rule, prescribe”).
192. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(c), 126 Stat. 306, 320
(2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
193. SEC Crowdfunding Proposal, supra note 20.
194. SEC Crowdfunding Adoption, supra note 21.
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states had enacted a crowdfunding law. On August 12, 2011 Kansas’s
“Invest Kansas Exemption” became effective,195 which Georgia quickly
followed with the “Invest Georgia Exemption,” effective December 8,
2011.196 Since then, thirteen other states have passed an exemption, with
legislation pending in at least twelve more.197 The result has been a
patchwork of laws with varying disclosure requirements, caps on issuers
and investors, and fit within the broader federal framework.198
The benefit of this patchwork approach is in its diversity, which has
allowed for greater experimentation.199 The synopses included below—
of crowdfunding laws passed in Indiana and Maryland, along with the
Model Crowdfunding Exemption promulgated by the NASAA—
demonstrate the breadth of that diversity among several different criteria,
including the use of an online intermediary, the amount issuers may raise
in a single offering, and the amount investors may invest.
1.

The “Invest Indiana Crowdfunding Exemption”

Indiana began allowing crowdfunding after it announced rules
governing such offerings on July 1, 2014.200 Like the majority of state
crowdfunding laws, Indiana’s relies on the intrastate exemption and thus
requires all crowdfunding to take place within the state’s borders.201
Indiana also requires the use of an internet portal.202 That portal must do
one of the following: (1) refrain from taking an interest in the sale of
posted offerings by not providing investment advice, soliciting
purchases or sales of its posted offerings, or tying its own fees or its
employees’ compensation to the amount of securities sold;203 or (2)
register with either the state as a broker-dealer204 or the federal
195. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21 (2016).
196. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2-.08 (2016).
197. Zeoli, supra note 22.
198. With respect to this last point, although a substantial majority of states base their blue sky
crowdfunding law on section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act, Maine relies on Rule 504 of Regulation
D. ME. STAT. tit. 32, § 16304 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.). Because so many
states rely on the intrastate exemption, this Comment does not address Maine’s approach.
199. See Soloman, supra note 26 (“The states that are filling the void are undertaking the great
experiment that Congress should have required in the first place.”).
200. Press Release, Office of the Indiana Secretary of State, Secretary of State Connie Lawson
Implements
Crowdfunding
in
Indiana
(July
1,
2014),
http://www.in.gov/sos/
securities/files/Crowdfunding_Rules_Press_Release_(7.1.14).pdf [https://perma.cc/AX5L-8X8B].
201. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(B) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.).
202. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(O).
203. Id. § 23-19-2-2.3(c).
204. Id. § 23-19-2-2.3(b).
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government as a broker-dealer or funding portal.205
Like issuers in the federal scheme, issuers in the state program must
disclose certain information to investors upfront206 and must make a
notice filing and pay a filing fee to the state.207 Unlike the federal
exemption and most other state exemptions, Indiana’s crowdfunding
legislation allows an issuer to raise up to $2 million in a twelve-month
period if that issuer provides each investor and the state’s commissioner
with audited financial statements.208 Without audited statements, issuers
are limited to raising $1 million.209 The duration and actual size of the
offering is set based on the issuer’s election of a minimum dollar amount
and a specified duration.210 While the offering takes place, the issuer
must set up an escrow account with a third-party financial institution,211
which will be the sole depository for investor funds if and until the
offering reaches the minimum threshold amount.212 If the offering
succeeds, the issuer must continue to provide investors with quarterly
reports detailing executive compensation and the business’s operational
and financial condition.213
Indiana, of course, also protects investors. The law places a hard limit
on all investments at $5000 per unaccredited investor per issuer,
regardless of income, unless the investor is accredited.214 During the
course of an offering prior to reaching the threshold minimum dollar
amount, any investor may decide to cancel her investment.215 Finally, the
statute does not comment on any resale restrictions.
2.

Maryland’s Crowdfunding Law
On May 15, 2014, Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley signed that

205. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(O)(v); see 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1 (2012) (federal funding portal registration
requirement); id. § 78o (federal broker-dealer registration requirement).
206. Required disclosure includes descriptions of: the company and its business plan; the
intended use of the offering’s proceeds; the identity of officers, directors, major shareholders; and
the terms and conditions of the securities offered. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(L).
207. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(F)(i).
208. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(C)(ii).
209. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(C)(i).
210. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(H) .
211. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(F)(iv).
212. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(F)(v). Although this escrow requirement is not contained in the JOBS
Act itself, the SEC’s rulemaking specifically requires creation of an escrow account. Crowdfunding,
80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,449 (Nov. 16, 2015).
213. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(P).
214. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(E).
215. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(F)(vi).
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state’s crowdfunding law, the Maryland Intrastate Small Business
Exemption.216 The statute itself, however, sets out only a skeletal
framework. Like Indiana’s law, the Maryland exemption relies on the
federal intrastate exemption.217 Most of the similarities between the
states’ statutes end there. Neither Maryland’s statute nor the order
promulgated by its Securities Division218 requires issuers to utilize an
online portal or other intermediary. Maryland’s offering limit,
$100,000,219 and its limit on how much purchasers may invest in a given
offering, $100,220 are by far the lowest of any enacted or proposed state
exemption.221 Particularly unusual is that the order limits offerings in
Maryland to permanently nontransferable promissory notes,222 rather
than equity interests.223
The Securities Division’s supplemental materials provide a set
number of additional requirements and limitations. All issuers must fill
out a disclosure form containing basic, relatively limited information
summarizing the nature of their business, the duration of the proposed
offering, and the amount the issuer intends to raise.224 The Division also
provides a form that each issuer must distribute to potential investors
with information including a list of both generic and company-specific
risk factors,225 a sheet detailing the intended use of the offering’s
proceeds, and a description of the company’s directors and employees
with a greater than ten percent interest in the company. 226 The general
nature of the information required in these disclosures makes them less
burdensome than in other states,227 which is appropriate given the law’s
lower per-company and per-investor ceilings.
216. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 11-601 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
217. Id. § 11-601(16)(i).
218. IN THE MATTER OF: MARYLAND INTRASTATE SMALL BUSINESS EXEMPTION, MD. SEC.
COMMISSIONER (2014) [hereinafter MARYLAND ORDER], http://www.oag.state.md.us/securities/
MISBEOrder.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKG8-JA3B].
219. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 11-601(16)(iii).
220. Id. § 11-601(16)(iv).
221. Cf. Zeoli, supra note 22.
222. MARYLAND ORDER, supra note 218.
223. Id. The order allows “[t]he Commissioner [to] extend by order the exemption under this
regulation to other types of securities” consistent with the public interest. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Masai McDougall, Maryland Securities Commissioner Finalizes Rules for Intrastate
Crowdfunding, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/
2014/10/53317-maryland-securities-commissioner-finalizes-rules-intrastate-crowdfunding/
[https://perma.cc/5M9J-DTL7].
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The Model Crowdfunding Exemption

The NASAA began promoting a state-led effort to establish new
crowdfunding rules prior to the passage of the JOBS Act.228 Although
Congress clearly did not heed the organization’s suggestion that “states
should be the primary regulator of small business capital formation,
including crowdfunding offerings,”229 the NASAA nonetheless
promulgated its own Model Crowdfunding Act to help guide state
regulators.230 The Model Act uses some similar safeguards to the Indiana
rule, but is significantly more cautious with regards to total offering
amount and per-investor limits.231
In many ways, the Model Act splits the difference between the
Indiana and Maryland crowdfunding exemptions. Companies would be
limited to raising $500,000 in any twelve-month period, and prior to
beginning the offering must set a target amount and period.232 If the
amount raised fails to reach the stated goal within the provided
timeframe, all proceeds must be returned to the investors.233 Companies
relying on the exemption must also notify their home state’s Securities
Administrator that the offering is taking place and disclose basic,
unaudited financial information prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles.234 The Act limits individuals to $1000
investments for any given company, and at any given time an individual
may only invest up to $2000 if their annual income does not exceed
$50,000, four percent of their annual income if they earn between
$50,000 and $100,000, and eight percent for individuals whose earnings
exceed $100,000.235
Similar to Title III and Indiana’s exemption, the Model Act utilizes
online intermediaries as a way to ensure issuer compliance and help
facilitate investor protection. Companies cannot advertise any details of
228. William Beatty, Legislative Proposals to Enhance Capital Formation for Small and
Emerging Growth Companies, Part II, NORTH AM. SEC. ADMINS. ASS’N, (May 1, 2014),
http://www.nasaa.org/30660/legislative-proposals-enhance-capital-formation-small-emerginggrowth-companies-part-ii/ [https://perma.cc/32KJ-2PLN].
229. Id.
230. Model
Crowdfunding
Exemption,
NORTH
AM.
SEC.
ADMINS.
ASS’N,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/wac6web/docs/NASAAmodel.html [https://perma.cc/BS96-BZWJ] (last
visited Apr. 27, 2016).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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their offering other than to point potential investors to an intermediary’s
website.236 Intermediaries must help protect investors by providing
access to the company’s financial disclosures, informing investors that
the entirety of their investment is subject to loss, and conducting
background checks on all companies and company management.237 The
Model Act also requires issuers to help ensure that per-investor limits
are followed, for both individual offerings and for aggregate per-investor
limits.238
III.

ANALYSIS OF CROWDFUNDING EXEMPTIONS AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES

State securities regulators are in an exceptionally good position to
protect investors against abuses in the context of small-dollar
offerings.239 In his recent written testimony before the House Committee
on Financial Services, NASAA President William Beatty not only
emphasized that “states have a more direct interest [than the federal
government] in these offerings,” but continued on to warn that certain,
more lenient crowdfunding provisions could “critically undermine the
potential success of equity-based crowdfunding.”240 Mr. Beatty focused
on several areas in particular: per-investor limits; issuer financial
disclosure; civil liability for fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions;
and maintenance of state-level protections.241 Under the logic of existing
securities regulation, these types of protections are even more important
in offerings directed at retail investors because those investors lack the
sophistication to fully understand the investment or wherewithal to hire
an expert. Investing in small businesses is a risk-laden proposition

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Beatty, supra note 228.
240. Id. Similar concerns were voiced in comments to the SEC’s proposed crowdfunding rules.
See, e.g., Letter from Tom Quaadman, Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Feb. 3, 2014) https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-0913/s70913-216.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK2V-WKRN] (“While Crowdfunding will provide new
opportunities for retail investors to engage with the capital markets, the [Chamber of Commerce]
also believes that strong investor protections are needed to provide a level playing field grounded in
certainty.”); Letter from William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Mass., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Feb. 3, 2014)
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-213.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G36-BFDJ] (“Because
crowdfunding offerings will involve significant numbers of small and unsophisticated purchasers, it
is crucial that the SEC’s crowdfunding rules protect vulnerable investors.”).
241. See Beatty, supra note 228.
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regardless of the context,242 but offerings conducted over the internet243
and to inexperienced investors244 are even more fecund soils for fraud
and loss.245
Concerns about the downsides of reduced regulation must be
balanced against the costs those regulations impose on businesses.
Regulations make sense only where the harm they prevent is greater than
the cost of compliance,246 and thus whether a particular provision is
appropriate should account for both its cost and potential benefits.247
Professor C. Steven Bradford attempted to balance these concerns in an
article written prior to the passage of the JOBS Act.248 Although that
discussion was in the context of federal crowdfunding regulation, many
of those similar concerns apply to the state-level context as well, based
on the similar goals of state and federal securities regulation—
encouraging capital formation while limiting investor harm. This Part
frequently references Professor Bradford’s recommendations with
respect to existing state crowdfunding exemptions and the new federal
regulations, with a focus on the statutes discussed above. To that end,
this final Part discusses each of the three parties to a crowdfunding
offering—the issuer, the intermediary, and the investor—in the context
of how each is, and should be, limited.

242. See
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
SMALL
BUS.
ASS’N
(Mar.
2014),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/FAQ_March_2014_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KP7CQCZ] (“About half of all new establishments survive five years or more and about one-third
survive 10 years or more.”).
243. Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J. SMALL
& EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 77–78 (1998) (“[T]he Internet may be less effective at selling securities
because of consumer perception of risk, because of the absence of personalized marketing, and
because it is difficult for consumers to evaluate and verify the quality of the information
provided.”).
244. See Bradford, supra note 5, at 109–12 (suggesting that a substantial portion of the American
public lacks financial literacy).
245. See generally id. at 104–16 (2012) (elaborating on the potential risks to investors in the
crowdfunding context based on problems of small business vulnerability and lack of investor
sophistication).
246. C. Steven Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504 and the Case for an
Unconditional Exemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 23 (2001) (“We should not pay a
million dollars to prevent a thousand dollar loss. Registration should be required only when the
expected gain from registration exceeds its expected cost.”).
247. See id. at 23–29 (summarizing studies about the costs of registering a securities offering and
offering some rationale for related benefits).
248. Bradford, supra note 5, at 117.
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Restrictions on Issuers

An offering’s success begins and ends with the issuer. Because small
business investments in particular raise concerns regarding fraud, selfdealing, and vulnerability to market forces,249 certain precautions should
be taken. These precautions are especially important when the investor
base lacks the resources or sophistication to fully appreciate the nature
of an investment. This Section discusses the two primary limits placed
on issuers interested in crowdfunding—per-offering limits and
disclosure requirements—as well as other important protections like the
use of per-offering floors and escrow accounts. Following the reasoning
argued by Professor Bradford,250 and the model adopted by the JOBS
Act, the regulatory burden placed on issuers should track the total
offering amount.
The dangers of fraud and undue speculation increase in step with an
offering’s size and the participating investors’ relative vulnerability.251
Although the size of a crowdfunded offering is dwarfed by traditional
initial public offerings (IPOs),252 limits to offering size can help reduce
the chance for excessive investor losses. Currently, the most lenient
jurisdictions limit their crowdfunding exemption to either $2 million, a
threshold set by Indiana and several other states,253 or the outlier $4
million allowed in Illinois.254 This higher limit contrasts with the
$100,000 ceiling in Maryland and $250,000 in Oregon.255
Of course, a specific dollar limit will always be somewhat arbitrary:
any one threshold will always be more than some companies intend to
raise and less than others need. More important than finding the best

249. See id. at 105–09.
250. Id. at 142.
251. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2016) (exempting offerings up to $1,000,000 to all investors
regardless of whether they are accredited, sophisticated, or otherwise), with id. § 230.506
(exempting an unlimited offering so long as investors are either accredited or sophisticated); see
also infra Section III.C (discussing the vulnerability of and enacted protections for investors).
252. The median IPOs for 2012, 2013, and 2014 were $94.3, $107.4, and $96.0 million
respectively. WILMERHALE, 2015 IPO REPORT 2 (2015), https://www.wilmerhale.com/
uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/
Publications/Documents/2015-WilmerHale-IPO-Report.pdf.
253. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(C)(ii) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.); 950
MASS. CODE REGS. § 14.402(B)(13)(o)(4) (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.2202a(1)(c)
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.202(26)(c)(1) (West, Westlaw
through 2015).
254. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4(S)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
255. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 11-601(16)(iii) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.); OR. ADMIN. R. 441-035-0090 (2016).
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ceiling is matching the regulatory burden placed on companies to the
amount raised.256 Basic economics suggests that a law that regulates a
company raising $50,000 to the same extent as one raising $1 million
disproportionately burdens the smaller company.257 Federal lawmakers
attempted to balance burdens and benefits by incorporating tiered
disclosure requirements into the JOBS Act.258 Not so for all states. Some
states that employ a tiered disclosure scheme have done so in a less
granular fashion. Indiana drew a line at $1 million, with everything
below that requiring unaudited financials and everything above requiring
audited numbers.259
B.

Restrictions on Intermediaries

The traditional, non-equity crowdfunding campaign is conducted
through an online platform.260 The SEC has noted that a registered
intermediary acts as “[o]ne of the key investor protections” used in the
JOBS Act.261 Although the JOBS Act and many states envision
channeling equity crowdfunding through online websites, such a
requirement is far from uniform.262 States have addressed online
crowdfunding portals in one of three ways: (i) specifying that all
crowdfunded offerings must be conducted through such a platform; (ii)
allowing, without requiring, offerings to be conducted online; or (iii)
refraining from specifying one way or another. This Comment argues
that required use of a portal is not only beneficial to businesses, but also
256. Bradford, supra note 5, at 118–20 (discussing how the ceiling on offerings under an
exemption should be related to the total regulatory burden, and stating that a larger exemption
“requires stronger assumptions about the cost of registration, the risk of loss, and the extent to
which registration reduces that risk.”).
257. See C. Steven Bradford, Transaction Exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933: An Economic
Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591, 614–22 (1996) (examining the then-existing regulatory structure and
intermediate disclosure requirements set forth by the SEC via Regulation D).
258. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text. Indiana’s Securities Division released
temporary rules pursuant to the state’s statute, but those rules simply reference the statutory
disclosure language without imposing additional requirements. IND. SEC. DIV., EMERGENCY RULE
§5
(2015),
http://www.in.gov/legislative/iac/20151216-IR-710150429ERA.xml.pdf
[https://perma.cc/665X-3VKN].
260. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text (discussing non-equity crowdfunding
websites).
261. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,390 (Nov. 16, 2015).
262. See supra note 171 (noting that the JOBS Act endorses online portals). Compare IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(O) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.) (requiring use of an online
portal), with MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 11-601(16) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.) (not requiring use of an online portal).
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protects investors.
Because funding platforms run the risk of being seen as public
solicitation, it is important to outline their legality before considering the
benefits of a funding platform requirement. Federal securities
exemptions begin with a baseline prohibition against all public
solicitation in connection with an exempted offering.263 Under the theory
that public solicitation would risk unnecessarily exciting investors,
public advertisements and offers to investors are permitted only in
registered, “public” offerings.264 This restriction was developed over
time through judicial decision and SEC regulation to combat perceived
dangers in public solicitation.265 Beginning with the Supreme Court’s
decision in SEC v. Ralston Purina,266 courts attempted to look to the
type of offerees at which solicitations were directed rather than examine
the breadth of advertising.267 In principle, the SEC agreed that the
determination of whether an offering should be public should be based
on the extent of the offeree’s required knowledge and the offeree’s
relationship with the issuer. The reality has been a general restriction on
solicitation without regard to the type of advertising used or the danger
posed.268
Prior to the SEC’s recent crowdfunding regulations, online
intermediaries occupied something of an uncomfortable middle ground.
The Commission had allowed internet portals to operate without
providing much clarity as to what constituted appropriate or
inappropriate solicitation.269 Notwithstanding blurry lines at the margins
263. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2016) (prohibiting “general solicitation or general advertising” for
offerings made pursuant Regulation D).
264. See Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)
¶
2770
(Nov.
6,
1962)
[hereinafter
Private Offering
Exemption],
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-4552.htm [https://perma.cc/W5BD-G6E8] (discussing the
Ralston Purina decision and the SEC’s interpretation of what constitutes a public offering).
265. See Stuart R. Cohn, Securities Markets for Small Issuers: The Barrier of Federal Solicitation
and Advertising Prohibitions, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (1986) (discussing the development of the
SEC’s prohibition on solicitation).
266. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
267. Id. at 127 (“The focus of inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the protections
afforded by registration.”); see Cohn, supra note 265, at 10. Wealthy investors or individuals with a
particular expertise are excluded from these prohibitions. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
268. Compare Private Offering Exemption, supra note 264 (“[T]he number of persons to whom
the offering is extended is relevant only to the question whether they have the requisite association
with and knowledge of the issuer which make the exemption available.”), with Cohn, supra note
265, at 11 (“[T]he SEC has succeeded in creating an impregnable rule against public solicitation
which replaces a judgment based upon consideration of the circumstances of the case.”).
269. Compare Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities Act Release No. 7233,
1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 3200 (Oct. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Online Delivery Release] (“The
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or in certain circumstances, restrictions on general solicitation apply to
internet activity just like any other type of communication.270
Accordingly, state crowdfunding laws and the SEC’s rules pursuant to
the JOBS Act appropriately allow online platforms to operate in this
space within certain limits.
Under the federal law, funding portals are expressly regulated and
allowed to replace traditional broker-dealers as intermediaries.271 In
addition, the JOBS Act expressly preempts states from enacting more
restrictive laws for funding portals registered with the SEC.272 Because
the federal law preempts only those funding portals registered with the
SEC, states would be free to enact more (or less) strict requirements for
funding portals that engage in crowdfunding within that state alone.
Indiana’s law, for example, requires that offers be “made
exclusively through one (1) or more Internet web sites,”273 while the
Model Rule states that “[a]ll offers and sales of securities in reliance
upon this exemption shall be made through an intermediary’s
website.”274 As discussed above,275 if an Indianan crowdfunding website
is registered as a broker-dealer under the Exchange Act,276 if it is
registered as a funding portal under the Securities Act, or if it meets
specific criteria that track the federal portal requirements, it need not
register with the state as a broker-dealer. State-level portal requirements
are important despite the JOBS Act because businesses may look to take
advantage of a state’s higher dollar threshold, like with Indiana’s $2
million limit, or other unique features, like with Maryland’s law
allowing for reduced reporting requirements.
Even at the state level, a centralized online portal has several
regulatory and capital-raising benefits. First, as an important aid for
investor protection, online portals encourage transparency by facilitating

placing of the offering materials on the Internet would not be consistent with the prohibition against
general solicitation or advertising in Rule 502(c) of Regulation D.”), with Bradford, supra note 5, at
64–65 (citing examples of SEC no-action letters and stating that “the SEC staff has approved
several web-based electronic matching systems”).
270. See Online Delivery Release, supra note 269 (rejecting a hypothetical situation where a
company makes common stock, sold in a private placement under Rule 506, available on an internet
site to persons who first provide the company with certain information).
271. See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text.
272. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i)(2) (2012).
273. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(O) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.).
274. Model Crowdfunding Exemption, supra note 230.
275. See supra notes 185–90 and accompanying text.
276. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(O)(v); see also id. § 23-19-2-2.3.
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communication between potential investors.277 The entire investor cohort
will benefit from their collective ability to gather and share information
with the group, allowing the knowledgeable to guide the uninformed.278
The benefits of group intelligence have been well documented.279
Crowds are often more effective than lone experts at making decisions,
including in the context of business performance.280 Of course, this
benefit comes with some baggage. For example, it is possible that some
people will (and do) invest simply because they follow others who they
presume have found a winner.281 This herd mentality is the type of
problem initial blue sky laws attempted to address.282
Furthermore, as the gatekeeper through which all issuers must pass,
intermediaries can assist in identifying those issuers who provide reason
for concern. For example, the final rules adopted by the SEC require an
intermediary to reject issuers who the intermediary has “reasonable basis
for believing” that the issuer or its officers would be subject to
disqualification as bad actors.283 These prohibitions—similar to those
under Rules 262 and 506284—cover disqualifying events including,
among other things, the issuer’s felony or misdemeanor convictions
within the last five years and injunctions within the last five years as a
277. Bradford, supra note 5, at 134.
278. Id. But see Fisch, supra note 243, at 77–79 (warning that differences between online and
traditional IPOs give rise to concern, including the trouble investors have when information over the
internet, the passive nature of internet offerings, and the lack of investment bankers to find and
educate investors).
279. See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 3–22 (2004) (discussing the
benefits of group wisdom and citing several studies on the subject). Surowiecki, comparing the
intelligence of a single expert against the wisdom of a large, diverse group, writes that “[w]e know
that the group’s decision will consistently be better than most of the people in the group, and that it
will be better decision after decision, while the performance of human experts will vary
dramatically depending on the problem they’re asked to solve.” Id. at 34.
280. Id. at 33–34 (2004) (citing an analysis by Wharton professor J. Scott Armstrong stating that
“above a low level . . . ’expertise and accuracy are unrelated’”).
281. In his book, Surowiecki discusses what economists call “information cascades,” where
people look to others’ habits as a way to determine whether a course of action is legitimate or safe.
See SUROWIECKI, supra note 279, at 50–63. Although potentially beneficial, information cascades
can result in bubbles. Id. at 57.
282. See supra notes 54–59.
283. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,479 (Nov. 16, 2015).
284. 17 C.F.R. § 230.262 (2016); id. § 230.506(d). These “bad actor” rules disqualify an issuer
from conducting an offering in certain circumstances, including if the issuer or any directors,
officers, or ten percent owners are subject to a criminal conviction or an injunction related to
securities violations. See Process for Requesting Waivers of “Bad Actor” Disqualification Under
Rule 262 of Regulation A and Rules 505 and 506 of Regulation D, SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/262-505-waiver.htm
[https://perma.cc/D5E3E5ME].
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result of a false filing with the SEC or other securities-related conduct.285
Although many states have similar bad actor disqualifications, not even
those who require internet portals use them to fulfill this function. For
example, Indiana incorporates Rule 262 as its bad actor disqualifier, but
simply says that its exemption “does not apply if an issuer or person
affiliated with the issuer . . . is subject to disqualification . . . contained
in . . . Rule 262.”286 Requiring intermediaries to help protect investors
will save regulatory costs and encourage transparency.
Second, using online portals can provide a platform through which
smaller, less well-known businesses can access investors they would not
have otherwise been able to reach.287 In a typical IPO, issuers receive
help from underwriters or other parties familiar with the investment
market.288 Although many sources of financing are available short of a
full-scale offering,289 often small business owners lack the network and
sophistication to market and sell their securities efficiently.290 Requiring,
or merely allowing, use of an internet platform may help those
businesses access a broader range of potential investors.291
Finally, because online portals act as gatekeepers, they can be used as
a means of educating investors. Federal lawmakers understood this. The
JOBS Act requires intermediaries to provide “investor education
materials,” and the SEC’s rulemaking reaffirmed the importance of
investor education.292 Unfortunately, even those states that require
offerings to pass through an online intermediary do not require those
intermediaries to provide education materials.293 Without an online
intermediary requirement, a means of educating potential investors in the
same manner is much more difficult.
285. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,479–80.
286. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(N) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.).
287. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 11, at 931–32.
288. Kurtis Urien & David Groshoff, An Essay Inquiry: Will the Jobs Act’s Transformative
Regulatory Regime for Equity Offerings Cost Investment Bankers’ Jobs?, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 559,
573 (2014); see WILLIAM M. PRIFTI, 1 SECURITIES PUB. & PRIV. OFFERINGS § 5:29 (2015)
(describing the role of finders—parties “paid to find funding sources for companies or
underwriters”—and their relationship to broker-dealer regulations specified in the securities laws).
289. See generally John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A
Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861 (2005) (describing different forms of debt and equity financing available to new
businesses, including venture capital and angel investors).
290. Campbell, supra note 112, at 89.
291. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 11, at 931.
292. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(3) (2012); see supra notes 176–80 and accompanying text.
293. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(O) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg.
Sess.) (requiring use of an online intermediary but not mentioning provision of education materials).
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Restrictions on Investors

Investor protections imposed by current crowdfunding exemptions are
as disparate as issuer limitations. Several states, including Maryland and
Indiana, have instituted an absolute ceiling on the amount an investor
may contribute to any single offering.294 Although ceiling benefits from
simplicity, it does nothing to tailor how much an individual can invest to
how much they could afford to lose.295 Indeed, a loss equal to the total
investment amount allowed by some state laws could be potentially
devastating.296 In contrast, other states use a “greater of” system like
Washington State, limiting investors to the greater of an income
percentage or a dollar amount.297 By linking per-investment limits to an
investor’s income, the Washington version creates a ceiling more
attuned to what an investor can afford to lose.
Another distinguishing factor among states is whether the cap applies
to how much an individual can invest in different offerings. For
example, even though Indiana requires that an “issuer [can] not accept
more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) from any single purchaser
unless the purchaser is an accredited investor,”298 the statute is silent on
whether a single individual could repeatedly invest $5000 with any
number of different companies. By comparison, Washington State
expressly limits “[t]he aggregate amount sold to any investor by one or
more issuers during the twelve-month period preceding the date of the
sale”299 to the amount discussed above. In effect, an Indiana investor

294. E.g. ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a)(14)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Second Spec. Sess.)
($5000 limit for unaccredited investors); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(E) (same); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 44-1844 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.) ($10,000 limit for
unaccredited investors); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-5-2-.08 (2016) (same); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS’NS § 11-601(16)(iv) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) ($100 limit for all
investors).
295. Bradford, supra note 5, at 127.
296. See, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2-.08 (limiting all unaccredited investors to
$10,000).
297. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.880 (2016) (limiting investors with annual income less than
$100,000 to the greater of $2000 or five percent of their income and investors with annual income
over $100,000 to the lesser of $100,000 or ten percent of their income); see also, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 517.0611 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.) (limiting investors with annual
income or net worth less than $100,000 to the greater of $2000 or five percent of annual income or
net worth and if income or net worth over $100,000 then to the lesser of $100,000 or ten percent of
income or net worth).
298. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(E).
299. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.880(1)(g). Even some tiered investor limits seem potentially
troublesome. Washington, D.C., sets a cap of $10,000 for anyone with an income of less than
$100,000 and $25,000 for anyone who makes less than $200,000. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 26-B,
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with a $40,000 income could invest $5000 as many times as he wanted,
while a similarly situated Washington investor would be limited to
investing her pot of $2000 in one company or spreading it among
several.
Of course, these differing approaches present benefits and drawbacks.
First, a per-investment limit would be most effective if directly tailored
to the investor’s individual circumstances; a limit as a percentage of
income serves as a more efficient proxy.300 Even though a percentage-ofincome limit is more difficult to administer than a flat amount in that it
requires either verification or self-certification, that difficulty is justified
as a means of protecting investors.301 Furthermore, a tailored limit
promotes policy goals expressed through securities regulation in other
areas: the JOBS Act itself applies a “percentage of” ceiling.302
Second, if the goal of a per-investor limit is to protect unsophisticated
investors from too much exposure, then investors should be limited in
the total amount they can invest per year, not simply per company.303 In
its comments that accompanied the SEC’s final crowdfunding rules, the
Commission noted the importance of “minimizing an investor’s
exposure to risk in a crowdfunding transaction” through conservative
investment limits.304 Although a per-year limit could potentially result in
fewer dollars flowing to startups, the lack of any annual limit fails to
protect against investor injury.305
CONCLUSION
The SEC’s slow response in implementing crowdfunding provisions
pursuant to the JOBS Act helped initiate a wave of state-level
legislation. This piecemeal approach has created an opportunity for
different jurisdictions to experiment with a wide variety of regulatory
schemes. Based on a review of these laws in the context of historical
§ 250.2(c)(i) (2016).
300. See Bradford, supra note 5, at 127–30.
301. See id.
302. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
303. See Bradford, supra note 5, at 126–31 (discussing the various forms an investment cap could
take and arguing for an annual limit).
304. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,394 (Nov. 16, 2015). The SEC interpreted an
ambiguity in the JOBS Act’s language that applied limits “if either the annual income or the net
worth of the investor is less than $100,000.” 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(i) (2012). The SEC
resolved the ambiguity—a lack of specificity about what to do when either income or net worth was
less than $100,000—by applying a “lesser of” test. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,394.
305. See Bradford, supra note 5, at 131.
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securities exemptions, there are some precautions states can and should
take in order to protect small-dollar investors. The measures specifically
advocated for in this Comment include tiered disclosure requirements
that increase to match the offering size, scaled per-investor limits that
place a ceiling on how much any one individual can invest, required use
of online portals, and limitation of solicitation throughout the offering.
Whatever limitations are put in place, the SEC’s overarching goals
should remain paramount: protecting investors, maintaining efficient
markets, and facilitating capital formation. In the crowdfunding context,
that means balancing “exciting new opportunities for small businesses
and startups”306 against President Roosevelt’s admonition that securities
sales “shall be accompanied by full publicity and information.”307 As
states continue to encourage small business investment and pass this
newest type of “blue sky” law, the best reminder might be the term’s
namesake: “an investment opportunity in which the promoter promises
rain but delivers blue sky.”308

306. Press Release, Jeff Merkley, supra note 16.
307. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
308. Fleming, supra note 42, at 586.

